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Leadership and Political Work 
 
Mukulika Banerjee 
London School of Economics 
 
 
You need not see what someone is doing 
To know if it is his vocation, 
 
you have only to watch his eyes: 
a cook mixing his sauce, a surgeon 
 
making a primary incision, 
a clerk completing a bill of lading, 
 
wear the same rapt expression, 
forgetting themselves in a function. 
 
How beautiful it is, 
that eye-on-the-object look. 




In the 2006 state level elections, West Bengal’s ruling coalition of Communist parties 
called the Left Front (LF), registered one of their biggest victories in over twenty 
elections and completed twenty-nine years of continuous rule in the state. However, 
despite their phenomenal victory, since then the government has been severely 
discredited for a number of reasons and this was in evidence at their poor showing in 
the Panchayat elections of 2008 and the national elections of 2009. Both phenomena – 
three decades of incumbency and their loss of credibility – require explanation. Were 
the two phenomena linked in any intrinsic way or did they just happen to have 
occurred in the same setting? Was the LF’s loss of credibility sudden, and caused by 
specific events or had it been brewing for some years? Much has already been 
analysed, specially taking into consideration state-level factors, the government’s and 
the Chief Minister’s performance and the significance of the key events at Nandigram 
and Singur. In this paper, I move away from these macro perspectives to focus 
attention on the local level, to examine the nature of the Communist Parties’ 
presence at the village level, and to see if an understanding of how their influence 
works at this local level provides an explanation for their growing failures. As we 
know, in West Bengal, the most important figure around whom local politics revolves 
is the local ‘Comrade’, and the state has thousands of such functioning figures. 
Ultimately, the mass appeal and the credibility of the LF government relied on the day 
to day performance of these figures; it is, therefore, by examining the workings of 
power and leadership at this level, that we might be able to gain some insight into 




The local Party boss in the adjoining villages of Chishti and Madanpur, where I 
conducted research in Birbhum district of West Bengal, the only man who was 
unambiguously and unfailingly referred to as ‘Comrade’, even by his wives, was the 
main Communist Party representative. He had been a Party worker for over 25 years. 
Comrade was the most powerful man, serving as the gatekeeper to the villages 
controlling access to news, information and opportunities to the villagers. His house 
lay on the edge of the highway and of the two villages, officially within the 
administrative boundary of Madanpur but on the side of the road where Chishti is 
situated. He thus lived at the cusp of both villages, commanding access to both and 
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also enjoying the easiest access to the main road for his loud and unmistakeable 
motorcycle, the first privately owned motorised transport in the villages. Both villages 
were full of men who were his erstwhile comrades and whom he had outmanoeuvred 
to become the party boss.  
Such a figure was fairly typical of Bengal. The Communist Party of India 
(Marxist), realising the fragility of vanguard political movements such as the Naxalites 
which mobilized the urban intelligentsia to revolutionize peasants, had over the years 
built up an intricate network of such Comrades across the State who were Party 
members, and who belonged to the area in which they worked and where they often 
owned land and businesses that sustained their political activities. They took their 
orders from the Party and organised political activities in their area, and were the 
conduit for the disbursement of funds, loans and benefits for much of the rural 
population.1 The Party headquarters in the capital utilized this capillary network of 
Comrades and cadres to exercise control in the furthest corners of the State. The most 
visible evidence of the efficiency of this machinery was available during elections, 
when voters were mobilized to turn up resulting in consistently high voter turnouts in 
West Bengal. The entire election campaign and its conduct were dominated by the 
activities of the Comrades and Party cadres. Elections were held practically every year 
because Panchayat, state and national level elections occurred in overlapping five 
yearly intervals. But in between elections political activity continued and was 
conducted through meetings of various labour unions of the Party who passed decisions 
that were in turn implemented by the cadres. In these meetings, agricultural and 
housing loans were awarded, budgets were allocated for various developmental 
activities and strategies for inducting new members into the Party organisation were 
discussed. Through the allocation of their shares among the villages they work in, the 
cadres built their allegiances which when aggregated at the state level gave the 
Communist Party its power base among the rural population. The success of the 
Communists in West Bengal thus relied heavily on the success of the tireless efforts of 
its Party cadres. While this fact is widely recognised, in this paper I will place the 
nature of these local level efforts under closer examination to outline what those 
efforts entailed in real terms (see Ruud 2003, Chatterjee 1997, Bhattacharya 2009).  
                                                 
1 The elected representatives such as those of the Panchayat also play a role but I will come back to them later.  
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In Bengal, the common way to describe someone involved in Party politics at 
any level, but especially at the local level, was to say that ‘he does Party’ (o Party 
korey).2 A person who was involved in the activities of the Communist Party’s work 
was therefore never described as merely ‘belonging’ or ‘supporting’ it or 
‘campaigning’ for that party, but actually ‘doing’ it.3 I call this ‘political work’ for it is 
clear that the popular perception of being a Communist was clearly that they did 
something. But given the wide-range of tasks undertaken by these local leaders, it was 
often quite hard to pin down what exactly they did. In this paper, through a fine 
grained description of these activities I aim to test the utility of the notion of 
‘political work’ as an analytical category to understand the nature of political 
leadership. It is a category that may have wider resonances for other local and non-
local kinds of leadership in India and elsewhere.  
The lines from W.H. Auden quoted at the start of this paper, close the engaging 
Introduction to The Oxford Book of Work by Keith Thomas. In this volume work of 
every age and profession is discussed, from that of fishing folk to office workers, 
schoolteachers to actors. Even the idleness of the rich and the beggars is discussed, as 
is the unrecognised work of the homemaker. But the work of the politician is strikingly 
missing. This raises the question whether there is something about the nature of 
political work which is strangely elusive, that resists description? Or does our usual 
scepticism about politics make us assume we know what politicians do and 
concentrate instead on understandings institutions and the machinations of larger 
structures such as political parties and governments? Or do most people simply assume 
that politicians are opportunistic parasites who don’t actually do much work of their 
own? And yet those of us who have spent time in the company of a consummate 
politician, recognise instantly Auden’s observation that you had only to watch the eyes 
to know how seriously he took his vocation, how far reaching his strategy could be as 
he planned his next move, even when the rest of his countenance is inscrutable. Like 
the other professionals Auden lists, you don’t have to see him doing work to be 
convinced that he does any, however the ineffable quality of political work resists it 
being counted among other kinds of labour. In this paper therefore, I will explore this 
elusive nature of ‘political work’ to examine what political leaders do. In particular, I 
                                                 
2 While ‘Party’ (marked here with a capital P) in most instances referred in short to the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist), it also did refer to its allies, such as the Forward Bloc, Revolutionary Socialist Party, Communist Party of 
India and others. In West Bengal, ‘Party’ does not refer to the opposition Congress or the Trinamul Congress. 
3 ‘Doing Party’ was thus an activity that not only ‘Comrades’ such as the one I introduced here did, but also hangers 
on, activists and others, whom I place in the penumbra of the Comrade’s later in the paper. 
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will focus on the work of local leadership based at the level of a village but whose 
sphere of influence covers a wider area. In a democracy where the government is 
expected to be mindful and responsive to popular desires, it is clear that work done by 
local leaders plays a crucial mediatory role between voters and policy makers. As I 
have argued elsewhere, in the case of West Bengal at least, it is the work of such 
leaders that ensured the continuing electoral success of the Communist-led 
government over nearly three decades (see Banerjee 2008 and 2009). The argument is 
based on research in two adjacent villages in Birbhum district of West Bengal, 
conducted over a period of ten years.  
The first thing to note about the Comrade is that he was rarely, if ever, seen to 
be doing anything. He was often absent from the village, leaving it at daybreak and 
returning in the shadows of dusk when most people were indoors or in the confines of 
the residential areas of the village. Yet his departures and arrivals through the main 
village lane was invariably noted and at any given point of time one could quite 
reliably establish if he was to be found at home by asking anyone, anywhere, in the 
village for his whereabouts. But even when he was around, one never saw him actually 
doing anything in particular. Although the owner of land, he was never seen to be 
farming, or mending a tube well, or carrying diesel – the sort of jobs that able-bodied 
men of the village routinely did. Instead, one occasionally saw him in conversation or 
seeing off visitors or sometimes at the tea stall. One never in fact even saw him eating 
or drinking; an occasional cigarette or bidi was all he consumed in public. His figure 
was unmistakable, well-built and fit though padded with more fat than your average 
farmer, a complexion just a shade lighter than those burnt by the sun as they toiled in 
the fields and brick kilns every day of the year. And while he dressed like everyone 
else, his lungi (sarong) was always less faded and frayed, he usually wore slippers 
though everyone else was bare feet and he had a gold chain around his neck. These 
slight differences made him different, but only just, to make people take note of him, 
to know that he was someone different and important. He was a man of the people, 
just like everyone else, but a bit different, a bit more prosperous and important. 
Thus, much like the gods of India, he ate and drank in private, rested in private, was 
better looking than his devotees, and his public appearances were just that – 
‘appearances’. To glimpse him therefore was almost akin to divine darsan.  
But despite this lack of evidence of doing any work, he enjoyed a reputation 
for working hard, from dawn to dusk and at all hours of day and night when he would 
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be sometimes called away from the comfort of his bed. People said that he was well 
connected to a wide network of Party workers throughout the State, with whom he 
met, consulted and negotiated funds and facilities for his village and was widely 
considered to be the most important asset of the villages’ life. When he was elected 
to the President’s post of the Block Kisan Sabha (a farmer’s union) this fact was noted 
with pride by all, and interpreted as a reward for his political talents, his deft 
manoeuvrings and ability to stand out within a large Party network. That the new post 
might bring him even more power to wrestle resources for the village was 
acknowledged but not overtly stated. Instead people called attention to the fact that 
it was their Comrade who was frequently called upon to fire fight when there was 
trouble elsewhere or when urgent help was required in the Party’s business, and these 
were cited as further evidence of his personal abilities. It was therefore assumed by 
most people that the large measure of his political work was conducted beyond the 
village, at the nearby town, or district headquarters or the various Party offices 
dotted around the countryside. The mobility afforded him by his coveted motorcycle 
was seen to be a fitting symbol of this ability to bridge the vast distances between the 
life of the village and of far off official spaces. This was an important aspect of the 
‘work’ he did. His political work thus did not necessarily include any of the obvious 
activities that one may assume to be the stuff of a villager’s life, at least not at the 
village level.  
Among hard working farmers, his status was clearly of a bhadralok, a status 
whose minimum requirement was the eschewing of any manual work (see Broomfield 
1968 and Ruud 2003: 72-75). The work that he did was manifestly not like the work 
done by the rest of the people of the village, who conducted hard physical labour. The 
work they did in their jobs as well as what they had to do in their homes, was mostly 
physical and covered their bodies in dirt, mud and dung, aged their complexions and 
used up every ounce of energy that they had. And this work was relentless, especially 
given the lack of basic amenities such as running water and electricity. So, there was 
always another chore to be completed before darkness fell, animals to be tended, 
another meal to be cooked, and a yard to be swept. Even when paid work was 
completed for the day, the domestic chores of a village life demanded the time and 
energy of those who lived in it, and so even ‘leisure’ time was dominated by a 
multitude of tasks big and small. Even the other bhadralok of the village, the 
schoolteachers, who spent their working day in white-collar work, returned home to 
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carry out similar sorts of tasks to the daily wage labourers that needed their attention. 
Almost all of them continued to have modest landholdings and therefore spent the 
daylight hours outside their working day tending to their fields and crops with their 
own hands, mending fences, fetching diesel on their cycles, tying up cattle. Thus 
everyone apart from the Comrade did work that placed an enormous demand on their 
bodies and time.  
The Comrade’s political work on the other hand, while obscured from view, 
was manifest in very different ways. Over a period of ten years while this study was 
conducted, the physical changes undergone by the villages themselves were 
noteworthy. Each visit revealed new roofs, submersible pumps, freshly installed 
electric wires, mobile phones – all of which were evidence that someone somewhere 
was doing something to make this all happen. There were also non-material signs – 
members of lower castes assumed an air of self-respect vis-à-vis the elite, landowners 
lived in nervousness of the share cropper’s whims, women belonged to cooperatives, 
rival political groups waxed and waned, people could explain the virtues of democracy 
in a language of citizenship and rights – these were all signs of some work being done 
somewhere by someone. 
But rather bizarrely, the Comrade’s actual physical absence from the village 
led to his omnipresence in conversations and decisions among people. No disputes 
could be considered resolved until the Comrade’s opinion had been considered and all 
major decisions, big or small, whether about new businesses or village festivals or 
even private events such as weddings were finalised only after his final approval. After 
years of living among them, when I could say that I had a fairly astute sense of most of 
the people in the villages and their personalities, I began to appreciate just how well 
the Comrade knew his constituency. Conversations with the Comrade himself revealed 
his thorough knowledge of the goings on in each and every household, of what people 
described as haandir khobor (news of the cooking pot). This allowed him to anticipate 
where trouble was brewing and the reasons behind them and he spent considerable 
time in planning and plotting his moves. On more than one occasion, his inexplicable 
decisions made sense only once the full set of events his actions had triggered, had 
unfolded. But in my occasional chats with him, the people of the village did not 
feature much. What he presented to the anthropologist was the face of the local 
leader who had a good grasp of Communist ideology and his diatribes against American 
neo-imperialism. After 9/11 he demonstrated to me with some deft arguments how 
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the incidents in New York and the subsequent war on terror by NATO had serious 
implications for India and its Muslims, Muslims like him, and his fellow villagers. His 
grasp of international politics was characterised by the anger and ideological hate of 
capitalist America and its allies, a line that was held resolutely from the headquarters 
of the CPI (M) to workers like him. In fact, on any given day, by noon, he usually knew 
what the ‘Party line’ on any current issue was. This of course was the result of the 
discipline and order of the cadres who read the official Communist paper Ganashakti 
every morning and avidly discussed its articles with other cadres whom he met during 
the day in the local Party office. By the evening he was able to slip some of these 
ideas into the circle of men at the tea stall. Over the years, his language, ideas and 
reportage have grown familiar and people expect this of him. Their ideas about 
communism, empowerment, and the place of their struggles on a larger stage were all 
filtered through his prism. His main asset therefore was his connectedness, i.e. the 
ability to bring some of the outside world into the village. In choosing to discuss issues 
about the economy or international politics with me, the Comrade was thus keen to 
give off the impression that his work was mainly ideological or at least driven by 
ideology rather than about the petty machinations he knew I was hearing about from 
the rest of the village. While we were both aware of how much of his work in act was 
more humdrum and even ‘dirty’, he chose never to mention this aspect of his work. 
But it is to this aspect I now turn. 
Entrepreneurial work 
West Bengal functions within Indian democracy, displaying the usual qualifications of 
regular elections, a multi-party system, a free press and a division of powers between 
the executive and judiciary arms of the State. The Communist Party and its allies 
however have dominated its politics, and have aimed to control more and more 
aspects of society than an ordinary political party. Through its workers, it has hoped to 
embed itself not only within the political process but exercise control over the non-
political arena of social activity. The most significant aspect of Communist rule in 
West Bengal was its extensive network of cadres all over the state, such that every 
group of villages had a Party office and Comrade who coordinated political and social 
activity in that area. For the first three decades of their rule, the Communist Party of 
India (Marxist) and its allies persisted without undue totalitarianism, because it 
endowed individual Comrades throughout the state with a small sum of social capital 
(accrued as a result of their membership and networks within the Party) and 
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encouraged them to use it to build up their power and influence further. This worked 
to their mutual advantage; the Comrade increased his power base by extending his 
networks and therefore his social capital and the Party benefited by increasing its 
reach into the lives of the people through its cadre.  
Thus the Comrade’s social network was his biggest asset. It was men who 
already possessed some of this power base, a sort of basic start-up social capital, who 
are inducted into the Party. Once selected by the Party to serve as its local 
representative, the Comrade was expected to multiply his networks to the extent that 
his power base ideally included every member of his constituency. At elections, every 
voter who was part of this network could be expected to cast their vote in favour of 
the Comrade’s Party, and so served as the moment when the interest accrued on 
social capital was banked. By the time my research began in the later 1990, the Party 
had been in power for several years and could back its cadres with an unprecedented 
confidence, and this allowed its workers greater room for manoeuvre. This meant that 
the Party and its comrades took greater risks with confidence that bordered on 
complacence about their positive electoral performance. The aims of their enterprise 
therefore became even more ambitious. Rather than just aiming to win elections, the 
Party turned its attention to the quieter periods in between elections, when political 
activity continued. As a result, a large part of the political work done by the Comrade 
was to fulfil the Party’s ambition to supplant all the traditional institutions both of the 
State and of the family, by controlling all aspects of social life. It did this by limiting 
the powers of the police and the district administration on the one hand while 
simultaneously filling the gap left by their absence. At the same time it ingratiated 
itself into each and every aspect of community life such that even innocuous non-
political organisations such as youth clubs or religious organisations were directly or 
indirectly controlled by Party cadres. It has thus effaced the traditional distinctions 
between state and civil society through its own overwhelming and ubiquitous 
presence, and is better represented by Chatterjee’s label of ‘political society’. It was 
the hegemonic capture of these non-electoral spaces, which in turn allowed for its 
success during elections (Chatterjee 2008).  
Let us now examine how the Party conducted this sort of exercise through its 
local representative at the village level, through looking in some detail at the workings 
of the Comrade in the villages of Madanpur and Chishti. The Comrade had 27 bigha of 
land on which he cultivated rice largely through hired labour. As a result he had not 
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suffered the financial ruin, which other members of the middle peasantry with similar 
sized landholdings underwent when land reforms were introduced in the early 1980s. 
One of the main outcomes of the reforms was to transfer share of the land to any 
labourer (bargadar) who had worked on a patron’s land for longer than 3 years. Having 
been alerted to the impending reforms, the Comrade had got rid of his bargadar in 
time and switched to hired labour. In addition to rice farming he also had a number of 
other businesses on the side. He was the first in the village to exploit the nearby 
riverbed to extract sand, which was sold to building contractors in the cities. He also 
utilised the sand for a brick-making business, and set up the first kilns in the village. 
His latest venture had been to set up a fisheries business, which he did by draining 
some of the village’s communal tanks of water (used for washing and bathing) for 
lucrative fish farming. For all of these ventures the financial capital was provided 
either by government’s interest free loans or capital accumulated from his previous 
enterprises. It was no surprise therefore to learn that the Comrade was also the most 
prosperous man in the village.  
The Comrade belonged to the Syed caste, which formed the elite in these two 
largely Muslim villages. Further he belonged to a specific network of Syeds who 
originally descended from a pir (a holy man) from Iran and therefore considered 
themselves among the ashraf of West Bengal.4 The Syeds mostly owned landholdings of 
5-30 bighas and made up the middle peasantry. They were largely endogamous, they 
evoked their foreign origins by speaking in Urdu among themselves and they 
considered themselves more pious and elite than any other Muslim group in West 
Bengal. As a result, in the villages under the Comrade’s jurisdiction, a large proportion 
of the economic and political elite was Syed who were both his relatives as well as 
political contemporaries.  
Given this description it would also be fair to assume that this Comrade was 
not very different from a typical feudal padrone a type of ‘big man’ found in most 
rural societies. Indeed to a certain extent that is what he was. But what made him a 
‘social capital-ist’, so to speak, was a whole different range of activities best 
described as political entrepreneurship, which I describe below. Unlike a mere feudal 
lord, whose main aim is to increase the power of his economic capital, which he holds 
                                                 
4 Richard Eaton in his definitive study on the spread of Islam in Bengal, identifies the ashraf as a category that included 
‘those Muslim claiming descent from immigrants beyond the Khyber — or at least from beyond Bengal, who cultivated 
high Perso-Islamic civilisation and its associated literature in Arabic, Persian and Urdu’ (Eaton 2000: 249). 
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together with patronage links, the Comrade also had an obligation to the Party. It was 
through his contacts within the Party that he could get advance information on loans 
or threaten a local bureaucrat for a permit for one of his ventures. These enterprises 
increased his personal wealth and well as his networks with more people who were 
bound to him by ties of loyalty and obligation. These networks were then activated 
when the Party required a show of their loyalty, mainly at times of elections. The 
Comrade thus played a delicately balanced game, which simultaneously increased his 
personal prosperity and his Party’s popularity.  
However, there were also potential competitors to him in the village among 
other Syed landowners, who despite their economic impoverishment after the reforms 
continued to have an enormous influence among the poorer labour classes of the 
villages. There were also a large proportion of people in the village who belonged to 
the lowers castes of Muslims such as Sheikh and Pathan. These castes belonged to the 
same economic strata as the minority Hindus from the two castes of Dom and Bagdi. 
These lower castes together made up the poorer section of the villages and it is they 
who worked as bargadars and hired labour on the lands of the Syeds. But because it 
was this class which had benefited most from the land reforms brought in by the 
Communists, the Comrade had little trouble in commanding the loyalty of this section 
of the village population and much of his ‘ideological work’ was done here. It was 
sitting among their huts that that the Comrade shared his communist vision for greater 
social equality and fairness and relayed ideas about how these could be achieved. 
Thus, for instance, the post 2001 elections initiative of setting up self-help groups 
through women’s cooperatives was executed at this level. Using his leverage within 
the village, he was able to swiftly and efficiently persuade some women (and their 
families) that this was necessary and beneficial in the long run. And it was by listening 
to their demands that the Comrade could feed back to his Party colleagues the 
lacunae in their policies. He thus acted as the crucial go-between between the Party 
and the people and facilitated the government’s responsiveness to the electorate. 
Despite his standing in the village, the Comrade had to be constantly vigilant 
that other Syeds, with different political leanings, did not encroach on his support. 
This was a real possibility as more and more peasants are beginning to question 
whether the government was a one-reform wonder. The daily wage, which had not 
increased again since the mid 1980s, did not seem as radical or generous in inflated 
prices of the new century, and the reach of the land reform programme had remained 
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patchy. Further, the much-needed reform of the agricultural markets had never 
materialized (see Harriss-White 2008), leaving West Bengal among the country’s least 
prosperous states despite recording the highest levels of rice production. The 
possibility of questioning the credibility of the Communists was thus a distinct 
possibility. Such a critique was most likely to be provoked by the Syeds who had been 
hardest hit by Communist policies. It was they who formed the literate minority in the 
village and who commanded an old feudal hold over their poorer tenants.  
But in order to oust the Communists from power, they needed to mobilise 
members of the poorer labour force who formed the bulk of the electorate and thus 
constantly wooed their attention. The Comrade therefore had to constantly pay 
attention to his networks among the Syeds and to make sure that no one man became 
too powerful or influential in his own right. He ensured this in a number of ways. The 
main tactic had been to keep the politics of the two villages separate from each 
other. Despite extensive kinship and marriage links across the two villages, and similar 
caste and class profiles, the two villages had very different reputations and 
maintained a distance from the other. This schism had roots in the personal biography 
of the Comrade who belonged to Madanpur but at the age of 17 ran away with and 
married a girl from Chishti leaving his first wife behind in Madanpur. Since then, the 
men of Chishti were seen to be emasculated and unable to control their women. The 
Comrade had since maintained two households, run by his two wives, one in each 
village, and through which he commanded the loyalty of the large number of retainers 
who worked in them. Further, his own brother lived in Madanpur, as did one of his 
sisters. Two other sisters lived in Chishti. In Madanpur, there were 3 Syed households 
who disagreed with his politics and it was widely known that they voted for the 
opposition party, Congress. He limited their opposition through impoverishment 
caused by the forced imposition of additional bargadars on their land, denying them 
jobs that they were qualified for and by threatening their livelihood by encouraging 
rival businesses. In Chishti, any sign of dissent from his former political allies was 
carefully dealt with to ultimately humiliate or compromise the principal actor. In one 
case when the political ambitions of a young educated Syed man became apparent, 
the Comrade personally slapped him in full view of several people including the young 
man’s friends. The news spread quickly and the reason provided on that occasion was 
that he had been punished for harassing a girl, thus allowing the Comrade to occupy 
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the higher moral ground, but everyone knew that this was retribution for the young 
man’s attempts to set up the Trinamul as a rival political cell in the village. 
There were about 5 other Syed households in Madanpur, which he controlled in 
other ways. Men who had brothers living in Chishti head most of these households. It 
was striking that of the dozen or so pairs of brothers who lived in the two villages, 
most of them were not on talking terms with each other. Investigation into these 
enmities revealed that in each case the roots of the discord lay in jealousy of the 
prosperity of one brother while the other struggled to turn his luck. The affluence in 
each case had been facilitated by a job or a loan or a marriage proposal arranged by 
the Comrade. By keeping the brothers divided through preferential treatment the 
Comrade had one of them constantly in his debt for having done him a favour, while 
keeping the other in sullen hope of being the next recipient of a favour. As a result the 
possibility of a united front of two brothers together challenging the might of the 
Comrade lay unrealised through the jealousy generated between them.  
It was also striking that in the daily life of the village with all its accompanying 
gossip, envy and avarice, each conflict was resolved only after the personal mediation 
of the Comrade. Employing considerable skills in magnifying ordinary village disputes 
to peace threatening proportions, the Comrade was able to make himself an 
indispensable arbitrator in all disputes. This embedded the Comrade in the daily life of 
every household allowing no matter to be considered too small to escape his 
attention. In each case, he restored order by issuing threats to the suspected mischief-
makers or by mollifying the injured party. But this did not necessarily follow a 
principled policy of seeking justice and truth. The accusations were usually arbitrary 
and the punishments did not bear any relation to the seriousness of the crime. It was 
this arbitrariness which resulted in everyone existing in a constant state of fear and 
even terror regarding the actions of the Comrade. By behaving in this fashion, every 
dispute became an occasion for the Comrade to entrench himself further in village 
politics and in the minds of the people.5  
The power consolidated thus, was also manifested itself in an exaggerated 
display from time to time. This was achieved through a series of actions daring in their 
scope and originality. One of the more spectacular ones was when he was seen to be 
helping to arrange a suitable marriage for a young girl, whose father was an active 
                                                 
5 See Arild Ruud’s valuable discussion on the role of gossip in constituting both the reputations of village leaders and 
the village political agenda in his Poetics of Village Politics, especially pages 183-204. 
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member of his political clique. But in private he carried on an affair with the young 
girl and her mother, simultaneously. While news of the goings on were the subject of 
hushed but outraged gossip among both men and women of the village, no one directly 
actually accused the Comrade of having transgressed sacrosanct moral boundaries. The 
reason for this was that each and everyone of his possible critics were themselves 
involved in some other dispute, which inevitably required the Comrade’s attention. It 
would have therefore have compromised their own interests severely to have publicly 
criticised him at this time. Their silence was thus further proof of the Comrade’s 
invincibility. In this instance he had taken a risky gamble that had paid off as he had 
successfully outfaced his severest critics. A large measure of his working/waking hours 
could thus be seen as dreaming up strategies to increase his self worth, reputation or 
consideration (Davis 1998). Davis lists at least four ways in which consideration is 
enhanced – letting people know that they can’t harm his interests without harming 
their own; by demonstration on third parties to evoke fear among observers; 
enticement; routinised coding of superiority such as dress and manners – and the 
Comrade appears to have used all of them at some point in time.  
 It was evident that the Comrade was able to increase his social networks 
through his well-laid plans, but also that these networks needed constant nurturing 
and involved people whose loyalties and indebtedness needed constant feeding and 
nurturing. When establishing his numerous businesses for instance, through which he 
also created new clients through employment, he was aware that these might alienate 
others. To take a small example, when he started his fisheries business in a particular 
pond, he transgressed communal rights to the ponds which compromised the power of 
other owners and inconvenienced their women who had further to walk for their daily 
bath. He thus countervailed his unilateral capture of communal resources by giving the 
man of the house most inconvenienced by the hatchery a subsidy for his transport 
business when they next round of loans came up 6 months later. Sustaining a web of 
networks thus required his constant vigilance, and in each relationship the risks were 
high. In the case described earlier, he deflected gossip about his affair with the young 
girl by arranging a spectacular match which her parents could never have managed 
themselves, thereby silencing any criticism from the rest of the village. He was able to 
do this because of his wide links across many villages and towns in the area, and his 
bringing in a proposal from a prosperous city family in this case was precisely a 
demonstration of the reach of his networks. In all of these instances, timing was of the 
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essence. The Comrade was patient; he was patient while formulating his strategy, and 
he had the ability to wait patiently to witness the results of his machinations. He 
could afford to play this game mainly because his Party was always present as the 
back up, the guarantor, in case a strategy went wrong and he needed bailing out.  
The Comrade was thus very similar to the kind of ‘wheeler-dealing rural politico-cum-
businessman revelling in a socialist environment’ that appeared all over Eastern 
Europe, and which Katherine Verdery dubbed ‘entrepratchiki’ – half entrepreneur and 
half apparatchik (Verdery 1995). A dense web of such men covered West Bengal, each 
took the small amounts of social and financial capital that the Party provided, i.e. the 
Left Front franchise, and invested it energetically to build popular support. They had 
carried out an informal but thorough penetration of every aspect of ‘civil society’ in 
rural life, from village football clubs to Id festivity committees. As a result, for many 
villagers any political figure of influence or achievement, whatever their actual 
political sympathies, was referred to as a ‘Comrade’. (I was asked, for example, who 
my Comrade was back home). Much like the ‘big men’ described by Mines in Tamil 
Nadu and Hansen in Mumbai, these Comrades rested their credibility on their efficacy 
and generosity and formed the elementary units of local politics in Bengal (Mines 1990 
and Hansen 2008). But unlike ‘fixers’ in other parts of India, these local leaders were 
also directly answerable to a capillary network of ‘Comrade’ figures all over West 
Bengal and formed the basis of the Communist Parties’ success in building a party 
organisation in the state (Manor 2004). It was their loyalty and efficiency in 
coordinating development programmes, political activities, and agricultural know-how 
across local units, which made them the envy of their political rivals. 
While this made demands on the Party’s resources, the gains were far in excess of the 
initial investment because it was through these ‘comrade’ figures it was able to widen 
its role and influence over every village in West Bengal, a feat otherwise impossible 
for a political party. Further, when observers assessed the performance of the 
Communist government, the Party was able to demonstrate this control as evidence of 
having democratically devolved powers to the most local, the most micro levels of the 
state. Such was the aggregate benefit of this investment in the local Comrades that 
through them the Party was able to capture the vocabulary of politics itself. In Bengal 
villages, there was only one word used to refer to the most powerful institution of the 
state: ‘Party’.  
Work and the division of labour 
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The overall political work done in West Bengal was of course the aggregate of very 
different kinds of work done by different types of political leaders. At the level of the 
villages itself, there were a number of other Communist leaders, with varying degrees 
of importance. While most people used the traditional language of dols, the various 
‘comrades’ who made up the ‘following’ in Bailey’s sense of the word, could be a 
fairly mutable group (Bailey 1969). In these dols or groups, there was a relatively 
permanent core of comrades, who were surrounded by those who had been co-opted 
for specific projects and there was a sliding scale of who was ‘in’ and who was ‘out’. 
As projects were completed and newer tasks emerged, others more suitable or 
committed to it were drafted in to replace the older ones. Maintaining the dol thus 
was in fact an important aspect of political work done by its members. In the 
Communist dol a proportionate representation of all the four Muslim castes and the 
two Hindu ones of Dom and Bagdi was ensured at any given time. Predictably, some 
were more important than others and foremost of these was Okho Dom – the most 
aggressive and powerful bargadar (sharecropper) and who had one of the largest 
shares of land in the village and was thus a most direct beneficiary of the LF’s main 
reform programmes. Other comrades included an entrepreneur who was an outsider to 
the village (save for an estranged brother). He was a committed and eager member, 
who used his Party work to create the networks other villagers had through existing 
kin. The Party work and the circle of camaraderie served to fill the place of a much-
missed family. Other young men (and they were all men) included the sons of 
erstwhile Communist Party workers who had been outmanoeuvred by the Comrade or 
those who had been to the local college and participated in union politics there. Each 
had something politically noteworthy in their personal histories that made them ideal 
choices. Whatever their differences, they were all people who had had a sound 
political education one way or another and who had a fire in their bellies. It was this 
penumbra of workers surrounding the core, which made their leader, the Comrade, 
shine brighter. By their loyalty and faith in the Comrade’s leadership they added 
credibility to his ideas, by following his instructions they added to his authority and by 
their own convictions they added to his charisma. Most of those who had been 
associated with the Party’s work saw themselves very much as Party workers at least 
for a limited period of time. But this label was prone to fade unless its association 
with political work was energetically renewed. Not many people could, even if they 
wished to, become permanent members of the core and they certainly could not 
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without the support of the Comrade. This aspiration was the incentive for their labours 
and as we have seen in the previous section, the Comrade managed them adroitly.  
Within the core, the most important division of labour was maintained between 
the Comrade and a man called Nathu Dom who was the Pradhan (President) of the 
local Panchayat Committee. As an elected candidate Nathu occupied his position of 
importance on the basis of a popular mandate. His personality was perfectly suited to 
the business of fighting elections. He was softly spoken, sober and the characteristic 
bend of his head slightly to one side gave the impression of him always willing to lend 
his ear to any demands and problems. He was seen around the village, strolling in the 
lanes around dusk for his daily constitutional but also tending to his fields industriously 
like others. He had a good reputation for even-handedness in disbursing benefits 
channelled through his office and its allocated budget. His visibility, accessibility and 
honesty made him an excellent candidate for a popular politician. But it was also 
widely accepted, implicitly even by Nathu himself, that he could make no decision 
without prior consultation with the Comrade. They strove for consensus but overall the 
Comrade had the last word. It was Nathu’s job to make sure that the decisions were 
executed fairly and judiciously. In fact their roles were entirely complementary; the 
Comrade spoke on behalf of the Party to the village and Nathu spoke on behalf of the 
village to the Party. Thus, when people had a problem or a request they approached 
Nathu for help, and they did this not so much for his personal leadership qualities, but 
for his position in the Panchayat organisation. This village level ethnographic 
observation of faith in the institutions of the Panchayat is true for most of the state of 
West Bengal. Here, the Panchayat enjoyed an ‘intensive and extensive’ appeal over all 
other rural institutions and people preferred ‘institutionalised problem solving … (such 
as a Panchayat) rather than individuals when in need’ (Bhattacharya 2009: 335-6). The 
same research also revealed, perhaps surprisingly, that the appeal of the institution of 
the Panchayat cut across party loyalties, such that Congress supporters were slightly 
more likely to approach the Panchayat with a problem.6 The sharing of responsibilities 
between Nathu and the Comrade that was a crucial aspect of their political work also 
helped them achieve a wide appeal. Even though the Comrade was unambiguously a 
Party man, by keeping his distance from him, Nathu could project the Panchayat as a 
                                                 
6 The figures from the NES (National Election Studies conducted by Lokniti, Centre for the Study of Democracy) survey 
data analysed in Bhattacharya 2009 show that 47 per cent of Congress supporters as compared to 44 per cent LF 
supporters were likely to approach the Panchayat. See figure 17.7 on p 336 in Bhattacharya 2009. 
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non-partisan body to the village. Further, this division of labour between the two most 
prominent village politicians reflected what was a widely recognised phenomenon in 
West Bengal, namely that all policy decisions were made by the Left Front and the 
civil service and other bodies were seen to be ‘mere rubber stamps’ and executors of 
these policies.7  
Political work could thus be said to be carried out by a division of labour 
between 
Nathu and the Comrade on the one hand who in Weber’s schema were the 
‘professional’ politicians i.e. people who had made politics their vocation, and those 
whom Weber characterized as ‘part-time’ politicians.8 Further Nathu could be said 
more obviously to be the one who lived ‘off’ politics and the Comrade who lived ‘for’ 
politics. The crucial Weberian distinction is a matter of economics because the 
politician who lives ‘off’ politics depends on it as a source of income. Nathu’s modest 
background and history of poverty, which was widely recognised as having been 
dramatically alleviated as a result of his occupation of the elected office, is a good 
example of how living off politics can be beneficial. This is despite the fact that 
Panchayat members are not paid a salary and so Nathu’s increased affluence was the 
result of benefits accrued as a secondary ‘outcome’ of his development projects. 
Interestingly, no one saw this as corruption and read it instead as one of the benefits 
of occupying an elected post. Instead they tended to highlight his commitment to the 
welfare of the village for which his attendance of meetings, negotiations with other 
Panchayats for a share of the budget and fighting elections were seen to be onerous 
and arduous tasks. His dedication to the common good was seen to be no less than the 
Comrade’s, an observation that finds support in Weber’s point that even such a person 
could be motivated with the same sincerity to the cause as the one who lives purely 
‘for’ politics. In Nathu’s’ case this could certainly be said to be the case. The Comrade 
could, on the other hand, could afford to live ‘for’ politics alone because of his private 
                                                 
7 It would however be erroneous to conclude that this made Left Front politicians, big or small, personally powerful.  
Rather, it was the ‘Party’ that was considered to be the ultimate basis (bhitti) for all decision-making rather than any 
one individual. The Comrade narrated an anecdote that illustrated this belief perfectly: the local MP of the area was 
Somnath Chatterjee a prominent parliamentarian in the central government and Speaker of the house. But on one of 
his election campaigns, he made the error of promising a school to a village, which petitioned him for one. The local 
Comrades, among who was ‘our’ Comrade, told him off roundly after the petitioners had left. They pointed out to him 
that all he could promise to do, in return for votes, was to look into the matter. He was told that the actual allocation 
of a school was a decision that only the local Party office could take after consulting with the local Comrades who 
could keep the Party’s grand design for the whole district in mind.  
8 This is not a category that appears in the much-cited 1946 translation of Weber’s essay ‘Politics as a Vocation’ by 
Gerth and Mills (1946). Instead a more recent translation (Gunlicks 1978) shows that Weber made more than just a 
distinction between ‘occasional’ and ‘professional’ politicians, and had implied a third category of the ‘part-time’ 
politician.  
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income, which Weber insisted is a prerequisite for this kind of professional politician. 
It was widely known that his family managed the Comrade’s lands for him and his sons 
his business ventures. As his brother pointed out to me sarcastically ‘well, someone 
has to look after the fields so the others can “do” Party’. 
As Weber confirmed the one who lives ‘for’ politics must also be economically 
dispensable, that is, ‘his income must not be dependant upon a constant and personal 
management of his labour and thinking entirely, or at least predominantly, in the 
service of economic gain’ (Gunlicks1978: 506-507). This leads to the rather important 
conclusion that a daily wage labourer for instance, could not therefore make for an 
ideal vocational politician for he would need to prioritise selling his labour for 
economic survival over political commitment. This therefore leads to the phenomenon 
so familiar in politics everywhere of professional politicians invariably drawn from 
some sort of plutocratic elite. But here Weber warning against the hasty conclusion 
that it is therefore only the elite who can be genuinely motivated for a political cause 
is worth heeding for he asserted that ‘there has never been a stratum that has not 
somehow lived off politics’ (ibid:508).9 The main advantage of having an elite 
leadership, he qualified, was merely that they did not ‘need to seek direct 
remuneration for their political service, as every politician without means must do’ 
(ibid:508). Thus our evidence too confirms that those who live ‘for’ politics probably 
make as much money ‘doing’ politics but what distinguishes them from elected 
representatives is that they can afford to be seen not to be gaining any direct material 
benefit from their political dedication.  
This emphasis on what a politician cannot appear to be seen to be getting out 
of being in politics lies at the heart of our understanding of the Comrade and the work 
that he does. For while evidence pointed to the fact that he was clearly the wealthiest 
man in the village and that this had something to do with his association with the 
Party, it was nevertheless impossible for anyone to pinpoint which of his political 
activities led to his wealth. His membership of an elite caste and family landholdings 
obscured the source of his wealth further. What was visible were the endless journeys 
he performed to attend meetings with other Party workers, address union gatherings, 
all of which were conducted away from the scrutiny of his fellow villagers. The 
                                                 
9 In fact, Weber concluded cynically exactly the opposite to be true:  that in fact that the only uncompromising and 
unconditional political idealism can only be found among the property-less who ‘stand entirely outside of the circles 
interested in maintaining the economic order of the society’ (Gunlicks 1978:509). 
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resulting connections, his immense social capital, were the only visible product of his 
labours. When he banked this ephemeral treasure, he gained the benefits in the form 
of a loan approved or tube wells issued, which he could pass on to Nathu and others to 
develop as ‘projects’ which enhanced the prosperity of the village. This allowed him 
to develop a higher worth than any other politician working in the village, whether 
professional or part-time. The leverage gained enabled him to extract recognition for 
it as and when he required it. But as we have seen, this was a finely calibrated 
judgement at all times; if he was too ham fisted he ran the danger of being seen as 
authoritarian, if he was too lily fingered he could lose ground to other aspirants. And 
while this delicate dance carried on, his son and the rest of his family could reap the 
‘real’ i.e. financial benefits of his consideration. He of course was the main 
beneficiary of these economic pursuits, having the first and last word on all projects, 
but he was never seen to be directly involved or benefiting from them. Further, unlike 
the worker who sold his labour for a wage, the Comrade’s social and financial 
entrepreneurship lay in the wait, in the ability to wait for a lucrative opportunity 
without being seen to be doing so.  
Conclusion  
Just prior to the 2006 Assembly elections a visit to Madanpur and Chishti revealed that 
the next ‘Comrade’ was being groomed. A young man, Shontosh Dom, had been 
identified as the ideal heir to the mantle and indeed his biography seemed well suited 
to the job. A young man, in his early twenties, he had just completed an 
undergraduate degree from the local college. Like his contemporaries in the region, he 
was unlikely to find a white-collar job and so had returned to working on his family’s 
modest lands and as a bargadar on someone else’s. He came from a small close-knit 
family of two brothers and a sister who shared the farming responsibilities with the 
father and a mother who helped out during the harvest. The atmosphere within their 
dark and ramshackle hut was one of easy harmony, dominated equally by the mother’s 
good humour and pride in her children and the father’s ethic of hard work and 
honesty. They seemed to take collective pride in Shontosh’s new role as a comrade 
and took it in turns to outline for me how he spent his day. The sister, who was 
visiting from her in-laws, conveyed genuine enthusiasm and possibly a touch of 
wistfulness, for the political work her brother now did. She too had decided to make 
the most of her own education by running a little school for the children in the village 
where she now lived. Shontosh himself spent most of the time watching them with a 
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shy smile on his lips and added a quiet word from time to time. But this demeanour 
clearly belied a fiery disposition for politics. At college he had got involved in student 
politics and it was his role in SFI-led agitations against the Congress led union that had 
gotten him noticed by the Party. In the induction process into his new job, he had 
been entrusted with the responsibility of helping people get their voter identification 
cards made for the forthcoming elections. This involved accompanying them to the 
local BDO’s office, filling out forms, checking their accuracy and generally helping 
them deal with paper work and a literate world. In his opinion this had been a very 
worthwhile experience as it enabled him to meet people, learn about their 
insecurities, demands and desires and this had allowed him to develop a bond of trust 
with them. He was also expected to travel widely to the surrounding villages, making a 
note for the Party what the government was doing and not managing to achieve in his 
area. In this, the two monthly meetings with more senior Comrades had been 
invaluable. From them he had started to learn the art of rhetoric, the interpretation 
of the Party’s ideology and techniques for its dissemination and was given basic 
lessons in ‘how to behave with people’. In the grooming process of this new 
‘Comrade’, the elements of political work discussed in this paper, could be observed 
clearly.  
By the elections of 2009, he was already more confident in himself, though a 
bit defensive on behalf of his party. A rival political faction, supporting Trinamul 
Congress had finally taken root, and for the first time since the 1960s Congress 
supporters openly expressed their preference and volubly campaigned for the Lok 
Sabha elections. The secret resentment against the Comrade’s interference in their 
lives had begun to be publicly expressed once the Left Front itself had been held 
accountable on the national stage because of its actions against the Singur and 
Nandigram agitations. As a result, one of the Comrade’s own penumbra had stood 
against the LF candidate in the 2008 Panchayat elections, and had registered a 
respectable defeat. The young Syed man, whom the Comrade had humiliated in front 
of others many years ago, had persisted in his political ambitions and now had a strong 
and visible following and they were actively campaigning for the forthcoming 
elections. Initial forecasts had projected a drubbing for the Left Front in 2009. The 
scenario for the budding Comrade was not therefore entirely dissimilar to the one that 
the older Comrade had had to face at the start of his political career. But unlike his 
predecessor, he might not have the luxury of a strong and ascendant political party 
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behind him. The results of the national elections revealed a severe loss of LF seats in 
the national parliament from West Bengal and the LF candidate from the 
parliamentary constituency containing Madanpur and Chishti also lost to the Trinamul 
Congress candidate. It will be thus be interesting to watch this young man’s career 
grow in coming years and to observe whether he chooses to or need to redefine the 
nature of his political work, of how he ‘does Party’. Will he continue to follow the 
divide and rule policy? How long will he continue to borrow his father’s cycle to make 
his journeys to do his political work? How long will it be before he acquires his own 
cycle? Or motorcycle? Or even a Tata Nano?10 Will his brother have to gradually take 
over all of the family’s farming responsibilities? Will he continue to assert that the 
Party paid him nothing, that he had to work hard for what he got? Or will he continue 
to insist that he wants to work selflessly? Will his work too slowly become invisible? We 
will have to wait and see. 
                                                 
10 This is the Rs. 100,000 affordable ‘people’s’ car that Tata Motors built in 2009 for the growing Indian market. 
Ironically, this is the car plant that had to be moved out of Singur, West Bengal, because of the way in which the LF 
government had handled the acquisition for the land for the factory and the protests that followed. The plant had to 
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